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I. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
A. TiE UNITED STATES AND UNCLOS
After a flurry of activity in 2007, election year politics largely subsumed efforts to
achieve U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS) in 2008.1 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved the treaty in
October 2007 by a seventeen to four vote and had referred it to the full Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification.2 But despite continuing widespread and bipartisan sup-
port for the treaty, including the support of the Bush Administration, the treaty was never
brought to a vote before the full Senate.3 In November 2008, John B. Bellinger, Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, described the scenario in the following terms:
Opponents were ultimately successful in keeping it from reaching the Senate floor
by making it clear that a debate on U.S. accession would trigger every possible proce-
dural maneuver and thereby take up maximum floor time. The Senate Majority
Leader decided not to send the treaty forward under these circumstances, and the
treaty has languished on the Senate calendar for the last year.4
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1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, available at
http://www.un.org/Deptslos/convention-agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm [hereinafter UNCLOS].
2. Jim Abrams, Senate Panel Backs Sea Treaty, LIBERTY MATTERS, Oct. 31, 2007, http://www.libertyinat-
ters.org/newsservice/2007/faxback/3180_Lost2.htm (UNCLOS was backed by all eleven Democrats and by
six Republicans, but was opposed by Senators Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), Norm Coleman (R-Nlinn.), Johnny
Isakson (R-Ga.), and David Vitter (R-La.)).
3. On the widespread support for UNCLOS during 2007, see Michael A. Becker, International Legal De-
velopments in Review, 2007 - Public International Law: International Law of the Sea, 42 LNr'L LA%,. 797, 797-99
(2008) [hereinafter Becker]. Supporters continued to urge ratification in 2008. See, e.g., Letter from R. Bruce
Josten & Gen. Jim Jones, U.S.M.C. (Ret.) to Sen. Harry Reid and Sen. Mitch McConnell (May 22, 2008),
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Reid-McConnell%201etterO8.pdf (expressing the strong support of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce for U.S. ratification of UNCLOS).
4. John B. Bellinger III, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Remarks at the Law of the Sea Institute,
Berkeley, Cal., (Nov. 3, 2008) available at http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2008/l1 1/bellinger-united-states-and-
law-of-sea.html [hereinafter Bellinger Remarks].
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As a result, treaty supporters at year's end focused on the extent to which the 2008
elections had improved the prospect of UNCLOS ratification in 2009. President Barack
Obama expressed strong support for the treaty during the campaign:
The oceans are a global resource and a global responsibility for which the U.S. can
and should take a more active role. I will work actively to ensure that the U.S. ratifies
the Law of the Sea Convention-an agreement supported by more than 150 countries
that will protect our economic and security interests while providing an important
international collaboration to protect the oceans and its resources.5
In addition, Vice President Joe Biden, who was Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee during the 2007 hearings, has long supported U.S. accession. 6 By contrast,
Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee for president in 2008, backed away from
UNCLOS during the campaign, even though he had previously been a supporter.7 Mc-
Cain's decision to "reconsider" his commitment to the treaty was at odds with the position
of his running-mate, Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska.8 Two former Republican adminis-
trators of the Environmental Protection Agency cited this "reconsideration" as a factor in
their decision to support Obama over McCain in the election. 9
Democratic gains in the U.S. Senate have increased the number of potential "yes" votes
in favor of ratification. The election of Senators Kay Hagan (D-N.C.), Jeff Merkley (D-
Ore.), and Mark Udall (D-Col.) replaced three potential "no" votes with three likely "yes"
votes. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether Senator Norm Coleman (R-Minn.)
would lose to challenger Al Franken. Coleman opposed the treaty in 2007. The positions
of at least two other newly elected senators-Mike Johanns (R-Neb.) and Jim Risch (R-
Id.) -are unknown. Johanns replaced Chuck Hagel, a vocal supporter of the treaty; Risch
replaced Larry Craig, a likely opponent.
Taken together, the election of President Obama and the democratic gains in the Senate
created favorable conditions for U.S. accession to UNCLOS, particularly given the wide-
spread interest in securing U.S. rights to exploit previously inaccessible hydrocarbon re-
sources beneath the Arctic seabed. Nonetheless, as UNCLOS supporters know well, a
determined minority has thwarted ratification for many years by advancing arguments and
5. See ScienceDebate2008.com, Barack Obama's Answers To The Top 14 Science Questions Facing
America, http://www.sciencedebate2008.com/www/index.php?id=42 (responding to a questionnaire submit-
ted to both presidential candidates by a consortium that included the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science and the National Academy of Sciences).
6. Press Release, Joseph R. Biden's Opening Statement at SFRC Hearing (Oct. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/references/senate/Biden-3 lOct07.pdf.
7. McCain Caters to GOP Voters, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, available at http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2007/oct/3 1/mccain-caters-32to-gop-voters/.
8. Letter from Gov. Sarah Palin to Sen. Ted Stevens and Sen. Lisa Murkowski (Sept. 13, 2007), available
at http://www.globalsolutions.org/files/general/PalinLOSLetter.pdf (emphasizing Alaska's interest in the
adjudication of "claims to submerged lands in the Arctic" and dismissing concerns over sovereignty).
9. William D. Ruckelhaus & Russell E. Train, Lifelong Republicans Make the Switch, TAMPA TIB., Nov. 1,
2008, available at http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/nov/01/co-lifelong-republicans-make-the-switch/
(Commentators have speculated that with the election behind him, McCain may revert to his previous posi-
tion); See also Hugo Miller, Arctic-Seabed Oil Claims by U.S. May Quicken Under New Senate, BLOOM-
BERG.COM, Nov. 20, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=axGnGj6o
DSqY&refer=home.
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assertions that can be fairly described as "inaccurate, outdated, or incomplete." 10 Given
the many challenges facing the new administration, UNCLOS ratification is by no means
a certainty in 2009, despite the military, commercial, and environmental interests that
ratification would advance.
B. RATIFICATION OF UNCLOS AND RELATED AGREEMENTS BY OTHER STATES
The number of other states parties to UNCLOS continues to grow. On July 9, 2008,
the Democratic Republic of Congo acceded to the treaty, and Liberia, which operates one
of the world's largest shipping registries, followed on September 25, 2008.11 Those two
countries, as well as Cape Verde and Guyana, also ratified the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, which deals with exploitation and manage-
ment of the deep seabed.12 In addition, Republic of Korea, Palau, Oman, Hungary, and
Slovakia ratified the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Conven-
tion Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, which now counts 72 states parties. 13
C. COMMISSION ON LJ sITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
Article 76 of UNCLOS defines the continental shelf and sets forth procedures for the
determination of its outer limit where the shelf extends more than 200 nautical miles from
the coastal state. 14 Claims to the continental shelf are administered by the Commission
on Limits of the Continental Shelf, a body established pursuant to UNCLOS. A state
must submit its application-including sophisticated scientific data to support the
claim-within ten years of the entry into force of UNCLOS for that state.' 5
In 2008, the Commission continued to review pending applications and received new
submissions from Barbados, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, and Japan.' 6 For several
states, May 2009 marks the end of the ten year submission deadline. This is expected to
generate a significant increase in submissions to the Commission, which reportedly "has
pressed in vain for more funding to review so much new data."' 17 Several countries took
10. Bellinger Remarks, supra note 4.
11. For a complete list of states parties to UNCLOS, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conven-
tion.agreements/convention-agreements.htm. Land-locked Switzerland also took steps to ratify the treaty in
2008, but, as of the time of writing, had not completed the ratification process. See Julia Slater, Switzerland
Takes On The Sea, SwssnwsFo, May 19, 2008, available at http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/front/
Switzerland takes on the sea.hnl?siteSect= 105&sid=9106668&rss=true&ty=st.
12. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 41, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention-agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
13. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks, Aug.
4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/texts/
fish-stocks agreement/CONF16437.hnn.
14. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 76.
15. Robert Lee Hotz, Board of Scientifs Is Swamped By Claims For Rich Sea Floors, THE WALL STREETJ.,
Feb. 22, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120363436202384279.htnl?mod=rss.
16. See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, http://www.un.org/Deptslos/clcs-new/
clcs.home.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).
17. Hotz, supra note 15.
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the position that a "pragmatic approach" is required to balance the Commission's increas-
ing workload with the fact that some states may be unable to comply with the ten year
deadline due to a lack of scientific and technical resources.18
H. Developments in the Arctic
In 2008, international attention remained focused on the continental shelf claims of the
Arctic states because of the considerable oil, gas, and mineral reserves believed to exist
beneath Arctic waters. Furthermore, the continued retreat of the polar ice cap opened the
Northern Sea Route (along Russia's northern shore) and substantial sections of the
Northwest Passage (in North America) to shipping traffic during part of the year.
These developments-and the perceived rapid pace of climate change in the re-
gion-generated cries of alarm in 2008, including warnings of a "coming anarchy" in which
Arctic states could be expected to "unilaterally grab" as much territory as possible and calls
for a new international treaty to manage the region.' 9 Other reports fretted that a resur-
gent Russia was already exploiting the region's strategic vacuum to intimidate its
neighbors. 20
Meanwhile, governments with a direct stake in the Arctic spent much of 2008 empha-
sizing just the opposite. In May, representatives from Canada, Denmark, Norway, the
Russian Federation, and the United States met in Ilulissat, Greenland to discuss chal-
lenges posed to the Arctic by climate change. In a concluding statement, the participants
emphasized that UNCLOS provides the framework for dealing with the issues facing the
Arctic-from protection of the marine environment to freedom of navigation-and that
"[wie therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to
govern the Arctic Ocean." 21 The Ilulissat Declaration stressed the importance of coopera-
tion in (1) the protection and preservation of the region's marine environment; (2) the
improvement of search and rescue capabilities as ship traffic increases in the region; and
(3) the collection of scientific data.22
Legal Advisor Bellinger of the State Department echoed these themes a month later in
the New York Times:
We should all cool down. While there may be a need to expand cooperation in some
areas, like search and rescue, there is already an extensive legal framework governing
the region. The five countries bordering the Arctic Ocean-the United States, Ca-
18. UNCLOS Meeting of States Parties, Eighteenth Meeting, New York, U.S., June 13-20, 2008 , U.N.
Doc. SPLOS/184 (July 21, 2008), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/docfUNDOC/GEN/N08/432/05/
PDF/N0843205.pdfOpenElement.
19. See, e.g., Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2008, available at http://fullaccess.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87206/
scott-g-borgerson/arctic-meltdown.html.
20. See The High North-The Arctic Contest Heats Up: What is Russia Up To In The Seas Above Europe?, THE
ECONOMIST Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?source=hp
textfeature&story-id= 12381767.
21. Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland, May 27-29, 2008, The Ilulissat Declaration (May 28,
2008), available at http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/lulissat-declaration.pdf. [hereinafter Ilulissat Declara-
tion] See also Bellinger Remarks, supra note 4 (summarizing the areas in which the participants agreed "there
may be room for improvement").
22. Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 21.
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nada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia-have made clear their commitment to observe
these international legal rules. In fact, top officials from these nations met last month
in Greenland to acknowledge their role in protecting the Arctic Ocean and to put to
rest the notion that there is a Wild West-type rush to claim and plunder its natural
resources.
2 3
In subsequent remarks, Bellinger further noted that in addition to UNCLOS, non-bind-
ing rules such as the International Maritime Organization's 2002 guidelines for ships op-
erating in ice-covered waters (the so-called Polar Code) and the Arctic Council's
Guidelines on offshore oil and gas activities supplement that framework. 24
Russia, too, appeared willing to dampen the media frenzy over competing Arctic claims
in 2008. Just one year after an elaborate stunt that involved planting a Russian flag on the
seabed at the North Pole,2 5 in October the Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized that
discussion of "a possible military conflict for Arctic resources is baseless;" that the region's
problems would be "solved on the basis of international law;" and that it was preparing an
application to extend the borders of its continental shelf in a manner fully consistent with
UNCLOS Article 76.26 The United States acknowledged as much.27
The European Union offered a less consistent message. In October 2008, the Euro-
pean Parliament expressed concern over potential "security threats for the EU" resulting
from "the ongoing race for natural resources in the Arctic," and suggested a need for
"international negotiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty for
the protection of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty."28 The resolu-
tion clearly tacked away from the UNCLOS-centered approach promoted by the United
States and others, and critics have pointed out that "[t]he situations in the Arctic and the
Antarctic are hardly analogous." 29 But in November 2008, the European Commission
issued its own report on the Arctic and emphasized the development of "a cooperative
Arctic governance system" based on UNCLOS, while also calling for permanent observer
status for the European Union in the Arctic Council, the intergovernmental body of Arc-
tic states focused on scientific and environmental issues. 30
In 2008, Canada continued to press its case for a special regime to cover the Northwest
Passage, the series of straits and channels connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans
23. John B. Bellinger, Treaty on Ice, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
06/23/opinion/23bellinger.html [hereinafter Bellinger]. Bellinger further emphasized that the United States
"should take full advantage of the existing rules" by signing up to UNCLOS. Id.
24. See Bellinger Remarks, supra note 4.
25. Cj. Chivers, Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://www.
nytimes.corr/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html.
26. Moscow Asks to Stop Arctic War Intimidations, INrERFAX, Oct. 22, 2008, available at http://www.istock
analyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/2730476.
27. Daily Briefing, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Russian Claims to Arctic Territory
(Taken Question) (Sept. 18, 2008), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/109928.htm.
28. Resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic Governance, EUR. PARE. Doc. P6_TA (2008) 0474, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sideslgetDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP/FTEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0474+0+DOC+
XML+VO//EN.
29. Bellinger, supra note 23 (nothing that among other factors, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by conti-
nents, while the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by oceans).
30. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The European
Union and the Arctic Region, Nov. 4, 2008, EUR. PAR.L. Doc. (COM 2008) 763 (2008), available at http://
www.europa-kommissionen.dk/upload/application/8a4b7e 1 e/uuu.pdf.
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through Arctic waters that are surrounded by Canadian lands. Canada views those water-
ways as historic internal waters. The United. States and the European Union, however,
treat the passage as an international strait subject to the right of transit passage. Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced in 2007 that Canada would construct two new
military facilities within "contested AR ic waters" to bolster its sovereignty claims.3 1
Harper continued to develop the theme in 2008. First, Harper announced that all ships
transiting Canada's Arctic waters would be required to register with NORDREG, Ca-
nada's Arctic marine traffic system.32 According to Harper, Canada's Coast Guard would
intercept and detain vessels that fail to comply with the reporting requirements.3 3 Harper
also announced that Canada would amend the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of
1970 to prohibit the deposit of waste from land or ship sources in Arctic waters within 200
nautical miles of the Canadian shoreline-a doubling in size of the regulatory zone over
which Canada intends to exert jurisdiction.34
IIM. Maritime Security
A. PIRAcY
Piracy off the coast of Somalia reached unprecedented levels in 2008 as pirates captured
larger ships and more valuable cargoes than ever before. As of late November 2008, ap-
proximately 100 acts of piracy had been reported in and around the Gulf of Aden-the busy
shipping lane that connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. 35 Pirates successfully cap-
tured vessels in approximately forty of those attacks.36 The ransoms reportedly paid for
the release of hijacked vessels, including their crews and cargoes, was projected to reach
fifty million dollars by year's end.37 Reports characterized the emergence of a piracy-
based economy in Somalia as "an extension of the corrupt, violent free-for-all that has
raged on land for [seventeen] years since the central government imploded in 1991."38
Despite international efforts to coordinate a multilateral response, Somali pirates ap-
peared emboldened by a string of high-profile attacks, many of which took place several
hundred miles from the coast. In April, pirates seized a French yacht, Le Ponant, with a
crew of thirty people. France dispatched Djibouti-based commandos to the scene, and a
two million dollar ransom was ultimately paid to secure the yacht's freedom. 39 Then in
September, Somali pirates captured the M/VFaina, a Ukrainian vessel carrying thirty mil-
31. See Becker, supra note 3, at 802-03.
32. Canada Requires Ship Registration in Arctic, MSNBC.coM, Aug. 27, 2008, available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26429116/ [hereinafter Ship Registration].
33. Id. This potentially would violate the right of transit passage through international straits guaranteed
by UNCLOS. But states bordering on international straits are allowed to prescribe traffic separation
schemes where necessary to promote the safe passage of ships; other measures to promote safe navigation may
also be lawful. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 38, 41-42.
34. Ship Registration, supra note 32.
35. Thom Shanker, U.S. Urges Merchant Ships to Try Steps to Foil Pirates, N.Y. TuMEs, Nov. 20, 2008.
36. Id.
37. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia's Pirates Flourish in a Lawless Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008.
38. Id. Some have partially attributed the rise of Somalia's lucrative piracy racket to the destruction of the
Somali fishing industry by illegal fishing practices perpetrated by foreign fleets. See The Indian Ocean: The
Most Dangerous Seas in the World, THE EcoNoMIST, July 17, 2008 [hereinafter The Indian Ocean].
39. The Indian Ocean, supra note 38.
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lion dollars of military equipment-T-72 tanks-to Kenya. 40 And in November, in perhaps
the most brazen act of piracy seen to date, pirates seized a Saudi-owned supertanker, the
Sirius Star, 500 miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya on its voyage from the Persian Gulf
to the United States with a $100 million cargo of oil.41 Just two weeks later, Somali
pirates engaged in another high-profile attack, hijacking a chemical tanker despite the
presence of private security contractors on board.42 The M/V Faina and the Sirius
Star-among several other vessels-remained anchored off the Somali coast in early De-
cember 2008, ransoms not yet paid. As a result of the attacks, shipping companies began
rerouting their ships to avoid the Suez Canal route, instead taking the longer and more
costly journey around the southern tip of Africa. 43
Responding to the escalating crisis, the U.N. Security Council adopted three resolu-
tions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Building on measures previously taken in
2007 concerning the use of convoys to protect shins delivering humanitarian supplies to
Somalia, in June 2008 the Security Council authorized states cooperating with Somalia's
transitional government to "[e]nter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea." 44 Resolution 1816 gave states the
right to use "all necessary means" consistent with international law to repress the unlawful
conduct, but also required advance notice of such activity to the Security Council.45 In
practical terms, the resolution made it lawful for foreign navies to chase pirates into So-
mali waters and, if necessary, to use force against them. Amid a worsening situation, the
Security Council dropped the notice requirement when it issued Resolution 1838 in Octo-
ber 2008. In more urgent terms, the Security Council called upon interested states "to
take part actively in the fight against piracy on the high seas off the coast of Somalia, in
particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft" to the region. 46
In connection with those two resolutions, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, India,47
Russia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States all dispatched warships
to the region during 2008.4 8 In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
deployed ships to the region in October 2008 to conduct anti-piracy operations.49 By
year's end, the NATO contingent was scheduled to be replaced by a European Union
40. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Pirates Capture Tanks and Global Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008.
41. Somali Pirates Grab Saudi Oil Tanker, N.Y. TwMES, Nov. 17, 2008; See also Ship Owners Call for UN-Led
Force, BBC NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008.
42. Nicholas Kulish, Legal Hurdles in West Slow Pursuit of Pirates, N.Y. TwMES, Nov. 29, 2008.
43. Abdi Sheikh, Major Shippers Skirt Gulf of Aden to Avoid Pirates, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2008.
44. S.C. Res. 1816, T 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). Articles 100-107 of UNCLOS already
provide the legal authority to seize pirate ships on the high seas. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 100-107.
45. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 44, ] 7.
46. S.C. Res. 1838, 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008).
47. In November, India reported that one of its warships had sunk a suspected pirate "mother ship"-a ship
used by pirates as a base of operations-in the Gulf of Aden. India 'to Step Up Piracy Battle', BBC NEws, Nov.
21, 2008. Subsequent reports indicated that the sunken vessel-a Thai tuna trawler-had only itself been hi-
jacked by pirates earlier that same day and that its crew was being held hostage when the Indian navy sunk the
vessel. India Navy Defends Piracy Sinking, BBC NEWS, Nov. 26, 2008.
48. Paul Reynolds, Rules Frustrate Anti-Piracy Efforts, BBC NEWS, Dec. 19, 2008.
49. Press Release, NATO, Standing NATO Maritime Group Transits Suez Canal En-Route to Anti-Piracy
Duties (Oct. 15, 2008); Press Release, NATO, NATO Task Group of Operation Allied Provider Has Escort
Duties (Oct. 27, 2008).
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fleet.50 Finally, in December 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1846, which
lauded those states that had already sent forces to the region and further authorized states
and regional organizations to seize and dispose of "boats, vessels, arms and other related
equipment" used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of
Somalia.Sl Importantly, Resolution 1846 also authorized seizures where there is "reasona-
ble ground for suspecting such use."52
The crisis has raised important legal questions. First, the proper procedures for investi-
gating and prosecuting acts of maritime piracy remain unclear to some actors, even
though UNCLOS provides that:
[t]he courts of the State which [carries] out the seizure [of a ship engaged in piracy]
may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to
be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third
parties acting in good faith.53
Nonetheless, the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
appealed to the U.N. Secretary General in November 2008, urging the Security Council
to establish "an effective legal jurisdiction" for bringing alleged offenders to justice. 54 The
Security Council responded quickly. Resolution 1846 calls upon all states to cooperate in
efforts to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for acts of
piracy.5 5 The Security Council also urged parties to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Convention) to
fully implement their obligations under that treaty, which provides for parties "to create
criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or
suspected of" acts of piracy or armed attacks at sea. 56
Second, how to deal with "suspected" pirates, as opposed to actors apprehended in the
course of an actual act of piracy, remains a point of uncertainty.5 7 In this respect, the
IMO specifically asked the Security Council to provide "clear rules of engagement" for
the anti-piracy forces operating in the region.SS The problem was partially addressed by
Resolution 1846, which, as noted above, authorized states to suppress piracy on the basis
50. Richard Norton-Taylor, British Warship to Lead EU Armada Into Gulf of Aden, THE GUARDIAN, Nov.
20, 2008; see also Kulish, supra note 42 (reporting that "Operation Atalanta" will consist of six frigates, three to
five airplanes, and some 1,200 people from as many as a dozen E.U. member states).
51. S.C. Res. 1846, $J 6, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008).
52. Id. $ 9.
53. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 105.
54. Press Release, International Maritime Organization, IMO Chief Makes Direct Appeal to Security
Council for Somalia Piracy Action (Nov. 21, 2008); see also James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy, Policy, and
Law, U.S. NAVAL INsT. PROCEEDINGS MAG. (Dec. 2008) (noting the uncertainty surrounding the appropri-
ate means by which to pursue prosecutions).
55. S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 51, 9 14.
56. Id. % 15.
57. For example, a Danish warship reportedly captured ten men suspected of being pirates in the Gulf of
Aden in September 2008, but the men were subsequently released after the Danes concluded that they lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute. Gettleman, Somalia's Pirates Flourish supra note 37. And despite the adoption of
Resolution 1846 in December, Danish authorities declined to arrest a group of suspected pirates that were
rescued from a disabled speedboat, despite the presence of suspicious weapons on board. Alan Cowell, Danish
Navy Rescues Suspected Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008.
58. Sheikh, supra note 43.
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of reasonable suspicion. 59 In the United States, a working group composed of representa-
tives from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security remained actively
engaged with this issue. 60
While the situation off Somalia remained troubling, there was better news elsewhere.
Across the continent, the twenty member states of the Maritime Organization of West and
Central Africa (MOWCA) adopted a Memorandum of Understanding in July 2008 to
establish a coast guard network for the sub-region, with coordinating centers in Accra,
Ghana and Luanda, Angola. 61 The agreement provides for coastal surveillance and autho-
rizes the "right of hot pursuit" to combat unlawful activity, including piracy.62 The initia-
tive is aimed at that region's own piracy problem, largely focused off Nigerian shores.
In addition, the Malaysia-based International Maritime Bureau reported in November
that maritime attacks in Asia decreased by eleven percent during the first nine months of
2008.63 This continues the even greater decrease seen in 2007. Indeed, while forty-seven
attacks were reported in the Gulf of Aden during the first quarter of 2008, only two at-
tacks were reported in the Straits of Malacca-until recently, the world's piracy epicenter. 64
The coordinated naval patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were given credit for
the decrease. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery Against Ships in Asia, signed in 2004, provides for such patrols.65
B. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE
The year 2008 marked the fifth anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI), the informal multinational network established by the Bush Administration in May
2003 to identify and disrupt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
their delivery systems, and related materials.66 Participating states agree to a set of "In-
terdiction Principles" and to the timely and accurate exchange of information concerning
suspected proliferation activity. 67 As of October 2008, ninety-one states had endorsed
those principles. Most of them met in May 2008 to reaffirm the network's goals. 68
On the operational side, in 2008, the United States participated in a PSI training exer-
cise hosted by New Zealand; ran its own exercise near the Panama Canal; and signed a
shipboarding agreement with the Bahamas. Earlier in the year, a 2007 shipboarding
agreement with Mongolia entered into force.69 Furthermore, in September 2008, the
U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the 2005 SUA Protocol, an im-
59. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 51, 9 9.
60. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 54. These efforts build on the comprehensive anti-piracy measures that
the Bush administration adopted in 2007 as part of the National Strategy for Maritime Security.
61. Press Release, International Maritime Organization, West and Central African States to Co-Operate in
Sub-Regional Coastguard Network (Aug. 12, 2008).
62. Id.
63. Mark McDonald, Maritime Hijackings are Decreasing in Asia, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 19, 2008.
64. Id.
65. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 54.
66. Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Washington Declaration for PSI 5th
Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting (May 28, 2008).
67. Id.
68. Id. A list of participants as of October 10, 2008 is available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.hn.
69. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Nonproliferation: U.S. Agen-
cies Have Taken Some Steps, But More Effort Is Needed To Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Secur-
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portant amendment to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation.70 The Protocol criminalizes WMD proliferation and pro-
vides independent legal authority to board ships suspected of proliferation activity. At the
time of writing, Congress had not yet passed the necessary implementing legislation.
In November 2008, then President-Elect Obama indicated that as part of his adminis-
tration's efforts to combat terrorism, he would seek to "institutionalize" the PSI.7 It
remains to be seen what this entails, but PSI proponents have routinely cited the net-
work's informal, non-institutional nature as an important part of its success. 72 Nonethe-
less, efforts to bring greater accountability to PSI methods and results-while respecting
the sensitive nature of PSI operations-may be the first step towards securing greater coop-
eration from states that have not yet committed to the PSI principles. These include
China, India, and Indonesia.
In November 2008, a report from the Government Accountability Office (the "GAO
Report") assessed the status of U.S. involvement with the PSI.73 The GAO Report rec-
ommended that U.S. law enforcement agencies establish "clear policies, procedures, and
indicators to support PSI activities" and that the Departments of State and Defense un-
dertake greater efforts to coordinate with the full range of PSI participating states, and not
only "the nineteen other leading PSI countries that attend multilateral meetings." 74 The
GAO Report noted critically that the Bush Administration had failed to comply with
binding and non-binding provisions of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, 75 which, among other things, required the President to issue a
directive to U.S. agencies to establish clear PSI policies and procedures, structures, fund-
ing, and performance indicators. 76 The GAO Report further noted that the Departments
of State and Defense had thus far failed to develop "a written strategy to resolve interdic-
tion issues," including how to handle the disposal of seized cargo and how to prosecute
individuals apprehended in the course of PSI interdictions. 77
IV. Whaling
In January 2008, the long-simmering dispute between Australia and Japan over whaling
practices in the Southern Ocean resurfaced. The controversy could increase international
scrutiny of both Japan's controversial whaling practices and Australia's claim to sover-
eignty over a large section of Antarctica and its coastal waters.78
ity Initiative, 22-24, GAO 09-43 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0943.pdf
[hereinafter GAO Report].
70. Id. at 24.
71. The Office of the President-Elect, Agenda: Homeland Security, http://change.gov/agenda/home-
landsecurityagenda (last visited Nov. 30, 2008).
72. See, e.g., Emma Belcher, Throwing Out the Batbwater, but Keeping the Baby, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov.
20, 2008.
73. GAO Report, supra note 69, at 1.
74. Id.
75. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat.
266, § 1821.
76. GAO Report, supra note 69, at 1-2, 8-9.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Only France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom recognize Australia's claim. See Whal-
ing: Salty Shepherd, THE EcoNoMisT, Jan. 24, 2008.
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Commercial whaling has been banned since 1986, but hunting whales for the purpose
of conducting scientific research is still permitted, with restrictions. 79 Operating under
that exception, Japanese whaling vessels have continued to hunt whales, including in the
Southern Ocean.80 In 1999, Australia declared a whale sanctuary throughout its Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), the maritime zone that extends 200 nautical miles from shore.
Because Australia also claims an EEZ off the coast of its disputed Antarctic territory, Aus-
tralia asserts that the whale sanctuary also applies in those waters.81
The conflict came to a head in January 2008, when an Australian environmental organi-
zation obtained an injunction in Australian federal court against a Japanese whaling com-
pany operating in the Southern Ocean.82 The court determined that the Japanese
company had breached Australian environmental law by killing whales in the purported
whale sanctuary. The Japanese company reportedly refused to accept service of the order
or to acknowledge Australia's right to regulate its conduct.8 3
Meanwhile, also in January 2008, activist groups Greenpeace and the Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society attempted to disrupt Japanese whaling operations in the region. In
one headline-grabbing maneuver, two Sea Shepherd protestors managed to board a Japa-
nese vessel at sea in an act of protest; they were subsequently detained on board for a
number of days.84 Continued hunting by Japanese whaling vessels in waters over which
Australia claims jurisdiction could eventually form the basis for a claim by Australia before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS), but it remains to be seen whether Australia is willing to defend its Antarctic
claims in an international forum.
V. Dispute Resolution
A. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
InJanuary 2008, Peru instituted proceedings against Chile before the ICJ.85 Peru seeks
the delimitation of its maritime boundary with Chile in the Pacific Ocean and validation
of its claimed EEZ.86 Chile has historically treated those waters as the high seas.87 The
case was in its early stages at year's end.
79. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. VIII, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161
U.N.T.S. 72.
80. See Whaling: Salty Shepherd, supra note 78.
81. Id.; see also Rosslyn Beeby, Whalers Refuse To Accept Injunction, CANBERRA TIMEs, Jan. 24, 2008.
82. Beeby, supra note 81.
83. Id.
84. Whaling: Salty Shepherd, supra note 78. The International Whaling Commission condemned Sea Shep-
herd's tactics, urging the organization "to refrain from dangerous actions that jeopardise safety at sea." Press
Release, International Whaling Commission, Statement on Safety At Sea made at the International Whaling
Commission's Intersessional Meeting (Apr. 23, 2008).
85. Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Peru Institutes Proceedings Against Chile With Regard to a Dis-
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In September 2008, public hearings in the case concerning Maritime Delimitation in
the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine) concluded and the ICJ began its deliberation. 88
Romania initiated the proceedings in 2004, seeking the establishment of a single maritime
boundary between the two states in the Black Sea, thereby delimiting the continental shelf
and the exclusive economic zones appertaining to them.89 The parties dispute the appro-
priate starting point for the maritime boundary and the methodology to be used in draw-
ing that boundary.
B. U.S. FEDERAL COURTS
1. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
In November 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.90 By a six to three margin, the Court invalidated court-imposed restrictions that
had prohibited the U.S. Navy from conducting training exercises that use powerful sonar
frequencies off the coast of southern California. Conservationists had argued that the use
of "mid-frequency active sonar" by the Navy causes severe injury or disruption to whales
and other marine mammals. A preliminary injunction by the federal district court-which
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld-had required the Navy to miti-
gate the potential harm before training exercises could resume.91 But the Supreme Court
held that "plaintiffs' ecological, scientific, and recreational interests in marine mammals"
were "plainly outweighed by the Navy's need to conduct realistic training exercises to
ensure that it is able to neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines," particularly
given (1) "the threat posed by enemy submarines and the need for extensive sonar training
to counter the threat" and (2) the speculative nature of the possible injury to plain-
tiffs-"harm to an unknown number of marine mammals that [plaintiffs] study and ob-
serve."92 The Court did acknowledge that "[m]ilitary interests do not always trump other
considerations," and the decision did not vacate other, undisputed portions of the lower
court's order, including the requirement that the Navy implement a twelve-mile coastal
buffer and avoid certain areas with particularly high concentrations of marine mammals. 93
2. United States v. Kun Yun Jho
In June 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned the dismissal
of criminal charges brought pursuant to the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS),
33 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.94 The court in United States v. Kun Yun Jho rejected defendants'
arguments that international law prohibited the government from prosecuting the princi-
88. Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine):
Conclusion of the Public Hearings (Sept. 19, 2008).
89. Id.
90. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
91. Id. at 367.
92. Id. at 378.
93. Id.
94. United States v. Kun YunJho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008). The APPS implements the obligations of
the United States under the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ship and
the related Protocol of 1978-collectively known as MARPOL. In October 2008, the United States ratified
Annex VI to MARPOL, which regulates the discharge of atmospheric pollutants from ships. News Release,
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pal offense charged in the indictments-the knowing failure to maintain the oil record
book aboard the MIT PACIFIC RUBY, a ship owned by co-defendant Overseas Shipbuild-
ing Group, Inc. and flying the flag of the Marshall Islands.95
The case arose out of a U.S. Coast Guard inspection of the ship during a U.S. port stop.
The Coast Guard discovered evidence that corroborated a tipster's allegations of unlawful
discharges and tampering with the ship's equipment. The government subsequently
charged the ship's owner and its chief engineer with violations of the APPS.96 But a
federal district court dismissed those charges after construing the alleged criminal conduct
to have occurred "outside U.S. waters," and therefore beyond the scope of the APPS.
97
The district court further concluded that the prosecution violated the APPS provision
requiring that its enforcement not conflict with international law.
The Fifth Circuit reversed that decision. First, the court explained that knowingly fail-
ing to maintain an accurate oil record book is a continuing offense that does not start and
finish when inaccurate information is first recorded:
Accurate oil record books are necessary to carry out the goals of MARPOL and the
APPS. If the record books did not have to be "maintained" while in the ports or
navigable waters of the United States, then a foreign-flagged vessel could avoid appli-
cation of the record book requirements simply by falsifying all of its record book
information just before entry into a port or navigable waters. If the oil record book
requirements could be avoided in this manner, the Coast Guard's ability to conduct
investigations against foreign-flagged vessels would be severely hindered, and the
regulation would allow polluters (and likely future polluters) to avoid detection. We
refuse to conclude that by imposing limitations on the APPS's application to foreign-
flagged vessels Congress intended so obviously to frustrate the government's ability
to enforce MARPOL's requirements.98
Second, the Fifth Circuit carefully explained that neither "the law of the flag doctrine" nor
UNCLOS provided any obstacle to U.S. enforcement of the APPS. The district court
had construed "the flag doctrine" to grant exclusive jurisdiction over the ship to its state of
registry, thereby precluding U.S. jurisdiction. But the Fifth Circuit rejected that reading
and reaffirmed the long established principle that "jurisdiction may be exercised concur-
rently by the flag state and a territorial state," including the port state. 99 The Fifth Circuit
also examined Articles 216 and 230 of UNCLOS, which concern the prevention, reduc-
tion, and control of pollution of the marine environment. On the basis of those provi-
sions, the lower court concluded that enforcing the APPS against the defendants would
International Maritime Organization, USA Ratifies International Rules on Air Pollution From Ships (Oct. 9,
2008).
95. "An oil record book includes, among other things, a log of the ship's discharge and disposal of oil and
certain oil-water mixtures." Kun Yun Jho, 534 F.3d at 400. See also Blank Rome LLP, U.S. Court Strikes
Down MARPOL and UNCLOS Defenses in OSG Prosecution (July 2008), http://www.blankrome.com/
index.cfm?contentlD=37&itemID= 1608.
96. Kun Yun Jbo, 534 F.3d at 400-01.
97. The APPS record book requirements only apply to foreign-flagged ships while in the navigable waters
of the United States, or while at a port or terminal under jurisdiction of the United States. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1902(a) (2008).
98. Kun Yun Jbo, 534 F.3d at 402.
99. Id. at 403.
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violate international law.' 00 Rejecting that argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
complete marine pollution prevention scheme of UNCLOS-which allocates various levels
of enforcement authority to port states, coastal states, and flag states-"actually broadens
the traditional authority given to a port state" to enforce marine pollution laws.10' The
court determined that nothing in the UNCLOS provisions cited by the lower court, nor
anywhere else in UNCLOS:
limits the power of a state to prosecute violations of its criminal laws that occur after
a ship has voluntarily entered its port. Instead, UNCLOS broadens the traditional
authority of a port state to allow a port state to pursue violations of marine pollution
law that occur outside of its ports, and in some circumstances, outside of its coastal
zones.102
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit confirmed the authority of the U.S. government "to prose-
cute MARPOL/APPS violations, at least in relation to falsified oil record books, no matter
where the actual alleged pollution incident and false oil record book entry occurred." 10 3
The decision is a strong statement of the complementary relationship between national
and international authorities directed at preventing pollution of the marine environment.
Furthermore, given the relatively few federal cases that address specific UNCLOS provi-
sions, the decision is notable for its careful and thoughtful analysis of the treaty.
100. The court was careful to note that because the United States is not a party to UNCLOS, the treaty is
relevant to the APPS "only to the extent that UNCLOS reflects customary international law." Kun YunJ.'o,
534 F.3d at 406. Because the court found no conflict between UNCLOS and the APPS in any event, it was
not required to decide which UNCLOS provisions had attained that status.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 409.
103. Blank Rome LLP, supra note 95.
VOL. 43, NO. 2
